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Abstract
We analyse the impact of internal migration in China on natives’ labour market
outcomes. We find evidence of a large positive correlation of the city share of migrants
with natives’ wages. Using different sets of control variables and instruments suggests
that the effect is causal. The large total migrant impact (+10% when one moves from
the first to the third quartile of the migrant variable distribution) arises from gains due
to complementarity with natives in the production function (+6.4%), and from gains
due to agglomeration economies (+3.3%). Finally, we find some evidence of a stronger
effect for skilled natives than for unskilled, as expected from theory. Overall, our
findings support large nominal wage gains that can be expected from further migration
and urbanisation in China.
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Introduction
In recent decades, China has witnessed a massive internal transfer of labour. By fuelling
Chinese cities with millions of non-local workers, the so-called “Great Migration” plays a
crucial role in the urbanization process of the country. The vast majority of migrant workers
come from rural areas, although urban-to-urban migration also exists. Rural migrant workers
- defined as agricultural people working and living outside the township of their household
registration for more than 6 months - were estimated at 153 million in 2010, a rough doubling
over the decade. As of 2010, they accounted for about 70% of the “floating” population1 and
44% of urban employment (Chan, 2012).2
Internal migration is the main force of incremental urban population since the end of
the 1990s. Yet migrant workers face major inequalities in Chinese cities, primarily because
they are denied the status of city dwellers as long as they do not hold a local household
registration or Hukou. Established in 1958, the Hukou system assigns every Chinese citizen a
registration status (Hukou) that records not only their place of residence but also their type
of registration. The Hukou type classifies people into “agricultural” or “non-agricultural”,
a classification which is usually referred to as “rural” and “urban” Hukou. By granting
differential access to welfare benefits between urban and rural residents and between local
and non-local residents, and by requiring official approval for a change in Hukou, the system
has strongly restricted population mobility for decades. Nowadays, most migrants, especially
those holding a rural registration, still hold their hometown Hukou and remain marginalized
citizens in cities. In particular, they are denied equal access to public services; they face poor
and unsafe working conditions; and they work primarily in the informal sector (Cai et al.,
2008; De´murger, Gurgand, Li and Yue, 2009).
This article estimates the impact of migrants on local residents’ nominal wages. As the
migrant population is getting increasingly larger both in number and as a share of the local
resident population, and despite the concentration of migrants in some specific segments of
local labour markets, concerns have been raised regarding their potentially negative impact
on local residents’ labour market outcomes. This fear mostly concerns rural migrants, who
are significantly less educated than their urban counterparts (De´murger et al., 2009; Deng
and Li, 2010). By creating a large unskilled labour supply shock, the inflow of rural migrants
could crowd out job opportunities for local workers and exert a downward pressure on wages.
1The floating population comprises all people with no local residency rights. It includes both migrant
workers and their dependants (non-working people), originating from either rural or urban areas. In contrast,
it excludes people who obtained a change in their household registration.
2The share of migrants in local employment sharply increased over the last two decades in China. Using
the 2000 Census data, Cai, Park and Zhao (2008) estimate that migrants, both rural and urban, accounted
for 19.6% of the employment in China’s cities (excluding townships) in 2000.
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Such concerns mirror similar issues raised in developed countries regarding international
migrants. In their thorough review of the large and much-debated literature on the effects
of immigration on local economies, Lewis and Peri (2015) conclude that immigration has a
positive impact on local wages for most native-born workers in industrialized countries. In
the case of U.S. immigration, earlier studies found dominant adverse effects on the economic
status of the least-skilled competing native workers (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997; Borjas,
2003) but more recent contributions show that the impact depends on immigrants’ and na-
tives’ respective skill distribution and how native workers move across skill cells in response
to immigration (Card, 2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Peri, 2012). Immigrants typically
differ from native workers in terms of age, education and occupation. As summarized by
Lewis and Peri (2015), these differences in skill characteristics have a number of theoretical
implications that must be taken into account when estimating the wage effect of immigra-
tion. First, the effect depends on the degree of substitutability or complementarity among
immigrant and native workers, which itself depends on natives’ characteristics. Second, when
confronted with immigration, native workers may chose to move either across space or across
occupations in response to increased competition, and this mobility may mitigate the poten-
tial adverse effect of immigration. We show for China that migrants do exert quite a large
positive effect on local residents’ wages, be they skilled or unskilled, and that the effect is
more positive for skilled workers, as expected from theory.
Most empirical studies focus on international migration in OECD countries (Docquier,
Ozden and Peri, 2014), and systematic evidence is missing on how migration affects local
productivity and wages in large developing countries, including China at the forefront, but
also India or Indonesia. Moreover, the change of geographical scale for such countries and
the relative smaller share of international migrants with respect to national ones makes it
important to assess the role of internal migration. This paper contributes to filling the gap
by assessing the extent to which internal migration in China affects urban residents’ wages.
Besides the effects identified in the literature on international migration, the simple increase
in urban population induced by migration flows may also be beneficial to labour productivity
through standard agglomeration economies.3 A further contribution of this paper is to pro-
pose an empirical strategy to decompose the migrants’ impact on local urban workers into
the part due to their substitutability/complementarity in the production function and the
part due to agglomeration effects.
3The standard explanation provided by economic geography for the positive impact of urban scale on
productivity consists in a series of agglomeration effects that include pure knowledge spillovers, the sharing
of inputs, and the pooling of the labour force. See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a thorough review of
the micro-foundations of these effects and Combes and Gobillon (2015) for a survey of the empirics of
agglomeration economies.
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We proceed in two steps. We first introduce city fixed effects in a standard individual
wage equation and assess the relative explanatory power of individual, firm and city effects.
Among other things, we highlight the large role of city effects in China. In a second step,
we explain the city fixed effects by both the share of migrants in local employment and
a number of city variables capturing agglomeration economies. As detailed in Lewis and
Peri (2015) and in Combes and Gobillon (2015), the estimation of both the migrant impact
and agglomeration effects on individual wages raises a number of specific methodological
issues, which we consider here. First, workers may sort spatially according to personal
characteristics (e.g., their skills), which generally affects their labour outcome. If this is
the case, it may be difficult to identify separately the role of local effects and the role of
the workers’ characteristics on their wages. We present evidence of a quasi-absence of local
resident workers’ sorting according to their observed skills across Chinese cities. Sorting on
unobservable variables not correlated to observables remains a possibility, but it is highly
unlikely in a country where mobility has been strongly restricted for decades. Second, and
most importantly for measuring migration externalities, the estimation of the impact of local
variables is almost inevitably plagued by a reverse causality bias. If large locations where
the share of migrants is high enjoy higher productivity, and therefore higher nominal wages,
then higher wages should also attract more workers, especially when they are mobile, thus
reversing the causality. We attempt to estimate the causal impact of migrants through a
thorough instrumentation strategy detailed in section 2.2.
There is a large and growing empirical literature analysing the Great Migration in China
and its consequences on labour market outcomes for migrants or for their family members
left behind. However, very few contributions relate to our approach. Meng and Zhang (2010)
is the only paper we found that tries to specifically evaluate the impact of rural migrants
on natives’ labour market outcomes in China. They find no significant impact of the rural
migrant inflow on average wages of urban workers, which may suggest that complementarities
between native and migrant workers compensate for the negative effect of the increase in
(unskilled) labour supply. However, this paper does not account for agglomeration effects
caused by the inflow of migrants as we do here, and does not emphasise the geographical
dimension of local labour markets that might be of particular importance in a fast urbanizing
country.4 In what follows, we propose an original approach to explore the simultaneous
4de Sousa and Poncet (2011) is another attempt to study the impact of migration on wages, in the
manufacturing sector only. However, they use the flow of non-residents newly-arrived in a province (in the
last 6 months) as a measure of migration, rather than the stock of migrants as we do here. Focusing on the flow
of new migrants strongly limits the scope of the analysis because the largest part of the migrant population
- those who have been in cities for more than 6 months - is simply missed. Moreover, the analysis is based
on aggregate rather than individual data, on a very aggregated spatial level of 29 provinces only. It relies
on a new economic geography model, which does not allow full separation of the migrant and agglomeration
4
impact of individual characteristics, geography, and migration in an urban perspective.
Our empirical analysis is based on individual data extracted from the 2007 Urban House-
hold Survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The database is a
representative sample of China’s main regions, but the sampling frame includes only regis-
tered urban residents. In other words, migrants whose Hukou is not a local one are excluded
from the sample. In order to identify migration externalities on urban residents’ wages (our
“natives” here), we use the 1% Population Survey of China conducted in 2005 to compute
the share of the migrant population in cities. We find evidence of a positive and significant
impact of the local share of migrants on natives’ wages. Our estimates suggest that if new
migrants move to a city at a constant number of local residents and if this move increases the
migrant share in total employment from the first quartile (decile respectively) of the distri-
bution of the migrant variable across Chinese cities to the last quartile (decile respectively),
then the associated natives’ wage increase in the city is 10% (33% respectively). Around
two-thirds of that figure comes from the complementarity of migrants with natives, and a
third results from agglomeration effects induced by the increase in total employment density
generated by the migrant inflow. If migrants were to replace natives in local employment,
thus keeping total employment density constant, the productivity of natives would increase
by 6.4% (20.6% respectively) just through the complementarity effect. We also find evidence
of a 25% lower total impact (50% lower for the complementarity effect) for unskilled natives
compared with skilled ones, though the differences are only marginally significant because
of insufficiently precise estimates. We control for some agglomeration effects other than
density and we instrument the a priori most endogenous variables. Over-identification and
weak-instruments tests are performed, and passed, for different sets of instruments. How-
ever, omitted permanent characteristics of cities relating to first-nature geography, transport
infrastructure or institution quality, for instance, might be correlated with wages, migrant
and density variables, and instruments. Further studies would be required to fully confirm
the magnitudes we obtain here and the causal impact of the migration and density variables.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the empirical strategy
followed in the paper. Section 2 describes the data sources and justifies our instrumental
variables strategy. Section 3 compares OLS and various IV estimates and discusses the
estimated magnitude of the migrant effects in Chinese cities. Section 4 concludes.
effects. A moderate downward pressure of the migrant variable on manufacturing wages is obtained when all
variables are instrumented by GMM.
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1 Empirical strategy
This section presents the framework for the simultaneous identification of substitutability /
complementarity and agglomeration effects of migrants. It also discusses possible endogeneity
biases arising from missing variables and reverse causality.
1.1 Substitutability/complementarity versus agglomeration effects
of migrants
The literature on immigration emphasises that migrants can have either a positive impact
on natives’ labour market outcomes, when their skills complement those of natives, or a
negative one when they substitute for natives. Typically, the wage of a native worker i,
wi, is regressed on a vector of individual characteristics Xi and the share of migrants in
the total employment of city c, LTc , which is given by MigShc =
LMc
LTc
, where LMc is migrant
employment. One estimates:
logwi = Xi α + λMigShc + εi. (1)
where εi is a generic random component. A positive λ illustrates the case where complemen-
tarities between natives and migrants increase the wages of native workers when the local
share of migrants increases. Importantly, Lewis and Peri (2015) emphasise that λ corresponds
only to the partial effect of migrants, which is evaluated for a given occupation and location
choice of the natives. As migrants affect local wages, this should in turn impact occupation
and location choice, which implies a feedback effect on natives’ wages, not captured by λ. In
the Chinese context, where occupational choice by local residents and migrants is segregated
and mobility is constrained, we believe that this effect should not cause any great difference
between partial and total migrant effects. In any case, the cross-sectional nature of available
data does not allow us to investigate individual occupation and location choice. Strictly
speaking, we only identify the partial effect of migrants, as most of the early literature on
international migration.
Lewis and Peri (2015) also emphasise that beyond controlling for natives’ characteristics,
it is interesting to investigate the role of migrants’ characteristics as well. Then one can
use such information to recover the average partial effect that corrects λ for the share of
migrants in each type (in terms of education level or gender for instance). Again, data
limitation prevents us from following such a route. Still, providing a first estimate of λ for
China is important, especially since we control for another series of local effects not always
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considered in the immigration literature.
Indeed, one limit to specification (1) relates to the fact that it does not control for local
effects that emerge from agglomeration economies.5 The local economy characteristics - first
and foremost its size - affect technological spillovers and pecuniary economies (better access
to final and intermediate inputs), and therefore local productivity. In turn, this affects local
nominal wages, with a possibly large impact6. Let DenTc =
LTc
Areac
denote total employment
density in city c, with Areac being the land area of city c. Typically, the agglomeration
literature estimates:
logwi = Xi α + β Den
T
c + εi. (2)
A positive β reflects the fact that denser areas induce agglomeration gains, which translate
into higher nominal wages. Because agglomeration also generates congestion effects, β only
reflects the total net effect of gains and costs from density. Typically, it may be found
negative when cities are too large. We discuss below the role of other agglomeration variables,
capturing in particular the absolute city size and not just density.
Specifications (1) and (2) are not consistent with each other, because each one misses the
other’s effects. When panel data are available, some authors in the immigration literature
control for local fixed effects. However, this strategy does not assess the role of time-varying
agglomeration economies. Neither does it consider that the impact of the migrant share
is a combination of the substitutability/complementarity of migrants and of agglomeration
effects. Indeed, the arrival of migrants in a city also impacts natives’ outcomes because
migrants make the city larger. This is one of our contributions, in proposing a specification
that encompasses both types of effects and allows us to identify each channel separately. To
see this, let us first note that the total employment density can be decomposed as follows:
DenTc =
LNc + L
M
c
Areac
=
DenNc
1−MigShc
(3)
where LNc and L
M
c are native and migrant employment in city c respectively, and Den
N
c is
the local density of native employment. Equation (2) leads to:
logwi = Xi α + β logDen
N
c + β log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
+ εi. (4)
This illustrates the idea that, for a given number of local natives, an increase in the num-
5Borjas (2003) advocates controlling for the size of the native workforce in order to provide a correct
interpretation of the impact of an increase in the size of the immigrant population on native labour market
outcomes. This could control for part of the agglomeration effects, but we push the intuition further here.
6See Combes and Gobillon (2015) for a review of theoretical underpinning, estimation strategy, and
standard estimates for such agglomeration effects.
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ber of migrants, and therefore of the migrant share, increases natives’ wages through ag-
glomeration economies reflected in a positive β. But (4) does not encompass the substitu-
tion/complementarity effects between migrants and natives that enter (1). One can augment
(4) to consider both, which gives:
logwi = Xi α + β logDen
N
c + β log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
+ λMigShc + εi. (5)
This specification, estimated under the constraint that the effects of the density of natives
and of the first variable for the migrants’ share are identical, would allow us to identify
both the agglomeration and the substitution/complementarity effects of migrants separately.
However, it would be highly dependent on the parametric choices made, and its estimation
would probably not be very robust, as the two migrant variables are likely to be highly
correlated (they are almost identical when MigShc is small). Furthermore, specification
(5) also underlines the role of the specification adopted for the substitution/complementarity
migrant effect in (1). The specification of the substitution/complementarity effect depends on
the functional form chosen for the production function, and the way native and migrant labour
enter it, which is an ad hoc choice. If we assume that the substitution/complementarity
migrant effect is proportional to log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
, instead of MigShc, we obtain:
logwi = Xi α + β logDen
N
c + (β + λ˜) log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
+ εi, (6)
where λ˜ is the new migrant substitutability/complementarity parameter. Specification (6)
uses the impact of the employment density of natives to identify the agglomeration effect, and
the total effect of the migrant variable corresponds to the sum of the migrant agglomeration
effect and the migrant substitution/complementarity effect.
λ˜ can be obtained by subtracting the estimate for β from the estimate for β+ λ˜. However,
such a separate identification of each effect is only possible when agglomeration effects from
natives and migrants are assumed to be identical, as implicitly assumed in equation (2),
which considers total employment. If this were not the case, one would only identify the
total (agglomeration plus substitution/complementarity) effect of migrants but, crucially,
agglomeration effects from natives would remain to be controlled for in the specification.
This is important because natives’ density and migrants’ share can be correlated in data
sets, and not controlling for the former, as often done in the immigration literature, would
bias the estimated impact of migrants.
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The following specification could also be estimated:
logwi = Xi α + β logDen
T
c + λMigShc + εi. (7)
However, this specification, only valid under the assumption of identical agglomeration effects
for natives and migrants, is also difficult to interpret because the total density is itself a
function of the share of migrants. Moreover, in the Chinese case, raw data correspond to
the employment density of natives only, and total employment density is obtained by adding
migrant employment that is less precisely measured. Both explanatory variables are subject
to measurement errors in (7), whereas this is only the case for one in (6). Similarly, reverse
causality mostly affects migrant employment, and therefore affects both variables in (7) but
only one in (6). As a consequence, equation (6) should also reduce endogeneity issues.
1.2 Other local effects and endogeneity concerns
Apart from employment density, other agglomeration economies variables are typically in-
cluded as additional explanatory variables in the economic geography literature. This is the
case for the city land area. Whereas density captures the role of the city size in terms of
thickness, land area captures its spatial extent. When agglomeration gains dominate, both
are expected to positively affect wages. Moreover, following Jacobs (1969), one may also ex-
pect a diverse local economic environment to favour innovation and productivity, and thereby
wages. This intuition is usually captured by introducing the inverse of a sector concentra-
tion Herfindhal index, which is what we do here. The city location within the network of
all other cities may also matter. Typically, if workers do benefit from the density of their
own city, they should also benefit, although probably to a lower extent, from the density of
neighbouring cities with which they are likely to interact. Economic geography models have
considered such a role of the access to distant markets. Empirically, it is usually captured by
market potential variables. We use the Harris (1954) definition, which simply corresponds
to the inverse-distance weighted sum of densities over all Chinese cities other than the city
considered. Following Au and Henderson (2006), we add as another control for the proximity
to external markets the distance to the closest seaport,7 which reflects the access to foreign
markets.8 Last, agglomeration economy variables also typically include the role of the local
7Among the 12 major coastal seaports in China (in terms of the volume of freight handled), which are, in
decreasing order: Shanghai, Ningbo, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Dalian, Rizhao, Yingkou,
Yantai, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang.
8Some studies, such as Hering and Poncet (2010) for China, use a structural version of market potential,
where a single variable encompasses the role of the city’s own size, the proximity to other large Chinese cities,
and the proximity to foreign markets. The specification we choose here is more flexible since it identifies a
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sector size, or specialisation, measured by the share in the local economy of employment in
the firm’s sector. Some technological spillovers or pecuniary economies can relate more to
the size of the sector within the local economy than to the overall size of the local economy.
Importantly, in order to simplify the treatment of heteroscedasticity and endogeneity, the
literature usually estimates the role of local variables in two steps (Combes and Gobillon,
2015):
logwi = Xi α + Lc(i)s(j(i)) γ + δc(i) + εi (8)
δc = (β + λ˜) log
(
1
1−MigShc
)
+ β logDenNc + Uc η + νc (9)
where δc(i) is a fixed effect for the city c where individual i locates. It captures the role
of any city effect, observed or not, that does not depend on the individual’s sector. The
vector of individual characteristics that affect productivity, Xi, includes gender, experience,
education and occupation.9 Some authors also use certain characteristics of the firm in which
individual i is employed. We consider here sectoral dummies, which allows us to focus only
on the spatial, and not the industrial, variations in wages. In the specific case of China, the
ownership of firms is another important determinant of workers’ wages (Chen, De´murger and
Fournier, 2005). Local effects that also depend on the sector, such as specialisation, Lcs, are
directly introduced in the first step as well. Then, in the second step, the city fixed effect
is regressed on the migrant variable, controlled for the role of the employment density of
natives, as suggested by (6), which is augmented by additional city variables embodied in
vector Uc. This second step is instrumented separately from the first step estimation.
OLS estimates for specification (9) can clearly suffer from endogeneity bias. Typically,
migrants are attracted by higher expected wages in the city, which they probably infer from
the high wages of natives (i.e., a high δc). This means that the share of migrants in the
city is affected by reverse causality. OLS estimates of agglomeration effects may also be
biased because of missing productive amenities in the wage specification. For instance, dense
areas may benefit from better public infrastructure (e.g., large train stations, airports or
universities). By making labour more productive, such amenities increase wages. They
also attract migrants to the city, who directly consume these amenities. This causes both
density and the share of migrants in the city to be correlated with the second step random
component.10
separate effect for these three underlying components.
9Within-the-firm experience is also sometimes considered but, unfortunately, such information is not
reported in the data set we use.
10Conversely, there is no reason to control for a local cost of living/price index. This point, made several
times in the literature, results from the fact that the estimated specification is derived from the firms’ optimal
use of labour, and not from a model of employees’ location choices (see Combes and Gobillon, 2015, for more
10
We tackle both endogeneity concerns by instrumentation and we instrument both the
migrant share and the native density variables, although endogeneity concerns are stronger
for the former. Indeed, they arise for migrants from both reverse causality and missing
amenities, and, most importantly, for recent location choices, whereas the population we
refer to as natives has either never moved or migrated long ago. In some specifications
we also extend instrumentation to the market potential variable, as it depends on native
employment in nearby cities, which may be correlated with own city’s native employment.
One could argue that land area and industrial diversity could also be affected by reverse
causality, but here the links start to become pretty weak and instrumenting for so many
variables at the same time is generally not meaningful. Still, we present estimations where
land area is also instrumented, and we verify that not controlling for other non-instrumented
agglomeration variables does not lead to significantly different estimates. For any further
specification and interpretation concerns of this approach and the solutions to deal with
endogeneity, which are now standard in economic geography, one can refer to Combes and
Gobillon (2015).
2 Data and instruments
2.1 Data sources
The data used are drawn from three main complementary sources: 1) individual data for
urban residents extracted from the 2007 Urban Household Survey conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), 2) migrant share in cities extracted from the 1% 2005
China Population survey, and 3) city-level data compiled from the 2008 China City Statistical
Yearbook published by the NBS. Additional data for instruments come from historical maps
and from Au and Henderson (2006).
The raw individual database is a sub-sample of the larger NBS Urban Household Survey.
It includes a subset of 16 provinces11 selected to obtain a representative sample of China’s four
major regions (large metropolitan cities, coastal region, central region and western region).
The 87 sampled prefecture-level cities12 were chosen following a stratified random sampling
method, and 10,000 households within cities were randomly sampled.
details on this issue).
11Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guang-
dong, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu.
12The NBS survey also covers four autonomous prefectures, all in Yunnan province. However, we cannot
keep them in the analysis because we do not have any information at the city-level such as area or total
employment for these autonomous prefectures.
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A major feature of the sample is that it only contains registered urban residents (i.e.,
the urban Hukou holders). This means that the observed wage disparities we focus on only
concern urban residents (’natives’). Migrants are accounted for through their share in city
employment, which is calculated from the 1% Population survey issued in 2005. Migrants
are defined as working individuals aged 16 to 60 who are not living in their county of Hukou
registration.13 Importantly, this includes migrants from both rural areas and other urban
areas.
The sample is restricted to individuals aged 16 to 70, who declared working at least part
of the year and earning (positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are
excluded because we cannot separate wages from profit in their case. Taking into account
these restrictions, we are left with 14,590 urban resident workers. The earnings variable is
the declared income from wage employment, which includes the basic salary and all sorts
of bonuses, allowances and subsidies (including housing or medical subsidies), other wages
(including overtime wages), and other income from work unit. A major drawback to the
NBS data is that no working times are recorded, which does not allow us either to separate
part-time and full-time workers, or to estimate an hourly wage model. Given this constraint,
we focus on total earnings from the work unit reported by wage workers who declared strictly
positive annual earnings.
City-level data come from the China City Statistical Yearbook 2008. The administrative
structure in China comprises four levels. In 2007, the mainland territory was divided into 31
province-level regions (excluding the two Special Administrative Regions, Hong Kong and
Macao), 333 prefecture-level regions (including 286 prefecture-level cities), 2,859 county-level
regions and 40,813 township-level regions (National Bureau of Statistics, 2008). Prefecture-
level cities in China typically include a city, its suburban districts, and a number of rural
counties under the jurisdiction of the city government. Employment and area statistics are
available at two levels: the whole prefecture and the metropolitan area (composed of the
city and suburban districts only). All the city-level variables used in the analysis refer to the
second level, the metropolitan area. Kernel density estimations, available upon request, for
the distribution of employment density, respectively for all prefecture-level cities in China
and for the 87 prefecture-level cities of our sample, show fairly close distribution patterns,
and confirm the representativeness of our sample of cities.
Table 4 in Appendix A reports summary statistics for all the variables related to migrant
and agglomeration effects. Spatial variations of our two main variables of interest, the density
of natives and the share of migrants, are quite large. Density at the last decile is almost 40
13The duration of migration can also be added to the definition of a migrant. The standard definition of
the NBS only considers individuals who have resided in the city for at least 6 months. However, using this
definition does not affect our conclusions.
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times larger than at the first decile, which is even larger than what is usually observed for
developed countries, thus making it important to control for in the estimations of the migrant
impact. For the migrant variable, the ratio is over 10. The raw migrant share varies from
8.4% at the first decile to 62.4% at the last decile. Other local variables present significant
spatial variations as well, but to a lower extent for some of them.
2.2 Instruments
To address endogeneity, we take an instrumental variable approach and we use several sets
of instruments as sources of exogenous variation for the suspected endogenous variable(s).
The standard practice since Ciccone and Hall (1996) to instrument for urban size or density
is to use historical variables such as long lags of population density. The rationale is that
the spatial distribution of population is persistent over time but the sources of productivity
differences, and therefore of wage differences, differ over time. Large places that were already
focal points for migrants centuries ago are still attractive today and act as a magnet for
modern migrants without necessarily being the places where wages currently benefit from
the largest shocks. Following this intuition, our first series of instruments relates to historical
data. As argued by Wu and Gaubatz (2013), the Chinese urban system is one of the world’s
oldest. It has evolved over time with major historical events, including the establishment of
foreign treaty ports that were part of the ‘unequal treaties’ that China signed with Western
countries in the late Qing dynasty.14 Although we do not have historical population data, we
identify important cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that became major economic
centres after the opening of the 48 treaty ports conceded to foreign countries between 1842
and 1920.15 From these historical data, we compute several indicators. First, we use a
dummy variable for cities that are either historic major cities or former treaty ports. Second,
we compute a ’peripherality’ index (average distance away) to these historic cities. This
captures the intuition that proximity to historical cities is a substitute from being exactly
located there, since interactions remain possible at not too long distances. In the same spirit,
we also consider an overall peripherality index that consists in the average distance of any
city to all cities, be they historic or not. Economic geography shows that “being central”
in the economy influences productivity, wages, and employment. Theory also suggests that
distance should be weighted by the level of economic activity when measuring centrality, for
the same reason that both local density and market potential variables are included in the
specification. This is also the reason why our peripherality instruments are not weighted by
population or employment. Therefore, they remain correlated with instrumented variables
14The system was abolished in 1943 after China signed new treaties with Britain and the US (Jia, 2014).
15Nancy Qian generously provided her data on these historical cities.
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but the unweighted measure increases the probability of not being too correlated with current
wage shocks.
The second set of instruments is borrowed from Au and Henderson (2006), who use 1990
data on city characteristics and amenities. We use the share of the manufacturing sector
in total employment, the share of non-agricultural employment in total employment, doc-
tors per capita and telephones per capita, all measured for the year 1990. The intuition is
that the past industrial composition of the cities should have influenced their total employ-
ment growth. Similarly, health or communication amenities that are valued by consumers
constitute standard determinants of migration flows. On the other hand, with an almost
twenty-year lag over a period of major reforms in China, past industrial composition, and
even more obviously past doctors and telephones rates, should not be too correlated with
current wage shocks.
Finally, the third set of instruments is composed of an instrument in the spirit of Bartik
(1991) but computed with cross-section data. The index corresponds to the population that
the city would have, if its workers were located in a city with total employment correspond-
ing to the mean city employment (nation-wide) for workers in the same occupation. More
precisely, to build this “occupation Henderson instrument” (as defined by Combes, Duran-
ton and Gobillon, 2012), we first compute the mean city employment for each occupation.
Then for each city, we compute the instrument by interacting the local share of employment
for an occupation with the mean employment at the city level for this occupation and then
summing across all occupations. Put differently, a city with a high proportion of managers
will be predicted to be large because on average over China, managers locate in larger cities,
while an urban area with a high proportion of blue-collar occupations will be predicted to
be small. This sort of instrument is interesting because it removes from the city size the
part that is not explained by its occupational structure, typically the part that could relate
to possibly missing variables in the wage equation and that makes the city actually larger
or smaller, or attractive for migrants. Therefore, such an instrument should be fairly ex-
ogenous to the random wage component and simultaneously be strong enough because the
occupational employment structure necessarily affects at least part of the city size.
Using instruments from different families should reduce the risk of weak instrument issues
and give more credence to over-identification tests. The cost could be some large differences
in estimates when using the different sets of instruments, because only local average treat-
ment effects (LATE) are identified, but this does not seem to be the case here, since all IV
estimations lead to very consistent estimates across specifications.
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3 Results
3.1 The explanatory power of individual wages and local effects
Before moving to our main second step estimations, corresponding to specification (9), we
provide a variance analysis of the first step estimation (specification 8) in order to assess the
main sources of variation in Chinese data. We estimate first step regressions that successively
include different sets of explanatory variables: location effects, individual characteristics, and
firm characteristics. As our interest here is in the relative contribution of the different sets,
we do not report the full estimation results but only focus on their adjusted R2, which
are displayed in Table 1, and on a variance analysis of the complete specification, which is
reported in Table 5 in Appendix B.
As expected, individual characteristics alone explain the largest share (25%) of the varia-
tions in individual wages, and the explanatory power of firm characteristics alone is smaller,
at 13%. Much less documented in the case of China, we also find that location accounts for
a non-negligible share of the variations in individual wages: city dummies and specialisation
together exhibit an explanatory power of 17%. Table 5 in Appendix B confirms that indi-
vidual characteristics are the main factors explaining individual wage disparities, but that
location effects matter and come in second place, above firm effects. Table 5 also indicates
that among local effects, specialisation explains very little of wage disparities, since local
effects operate at the global city level, not within sectors. These results closely match those
obtained for developed countries (Combes and Gobillon, 2015).
Table 1: Explanatory power of various sets of right-hand side variables
Adj. R2 for individual wages in 2007 (log wage) as a function of:
City effects 0.17
Individual characteristics 0.25
Firm characteristics 0.13
City effects and Individual characteristics 0.41
City effects and Firm characteristics 0.32
Individual characteristics and Firm characteristics 0.28
All three sets 0.44
N 14,590
Notes: City effects include both city fixed effects and the specialisation variable.
Importantly, Table 1 also reveals a fairly strong orthogonality of the three groups of
effects. City effects and individual characteristics together explain 41% of wage disparities
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when the sum of their individual R2 is 0.42, while city and firm effects explain 30% for a
sum of their individual R2 at 0.28. Individual and firm effects are slightly more correlated.
This means that higher wages observed in some cities cannot be attributed to differences in
the composition of the labour force or the type of firms present there. Put differently, there
is no sorting of workers across cities according to their skills, a finding corroborated by the
absence of correlation between the effect of individual characteristics and city-level dummies
(with a non-significant correlation coefficient at 0.0012). This finding for China is in sharp
contrast with what is usually obtained for developed countries, where a large fraction of the
explanatory power of city effects arises from the sorting of workers (see Combes and Gobillon,
2015).
To further examine the absence of sorting hypothesis, we run additional regressions not
reported here. If individuals were sorted across cities according to their abilities, some local
variables - density and the migrant share in particular - would be correlated with individual
characteristics such as education or occupation. Hence, one would expect their estimated
effect in the second step to change when individual characteristics are not included in the
first step specification. As for China, the elasticity of the density and of the migrant effect
is found to be very stable across specifications, with and without individual controls in the
first step.
Sorting could occur on unobserved characteristics too. Combes, Duranton and Gobillon
(2008), who control for a worker fixed effect in a panel setting for France, show that indi-
vidual fixed effects are actually strongly correlated with density. Not controlling for them
overestimates the density effect by a factor of 2. The cross-section nature of our data prevents
us from implementing a similar strategy. This should not be a major concern though, since
we show that even observed individual characteristics such as education or firm ownership
are not correlated with local effects, and no sorting on those observed characteristics takes
place. It is difficult to imagine unobserved individual characteristics that would not be cor-
related with our individual observed variables and yet would be correlated with the migrant
and density variables. Therefore we are confident that no large bias emerges from individual
sorting. Since our database covers urban Hukou holders only, the sorting hypothesis refers
in any case to this part of the urban population alone. In this context, the absence of sort-
ing is not surprising, because labour mobility towards urban areas with a change in Hukou
has been highly restricted for decades and remains controlled. Still, individual sorting will
deserve further investigation once suitable data are available for China.
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3.2 The impact of migrants
Our main results are provided in Table 2,16 which displays both OLS and IV estimations for
the second step specification.17 In the two-stage setting we adopt here, a concern regarding
the second stage estimation arises because we use estimated fixed effects as the dependent
variable. To account for the measurement error thus generated, we also compute feasible
generalised least square (FGLS) estimates for the second step. As shown in Appendix D,
no major difference with the OLS estimates presented in Table 2 emerges. This may be
attributed to the precise estimation of local effects in the first stage, itself resulting from the
use of individual data and the presence of marked spatial wage disparities in China.
Our first main result relates to the large univariate correlation between city fixed effects
and the city share of migrants. Alone, the migrant variable explains 54% of the variance (col-
umn (1)) when employment density alone explains 18% (column (2)). The migrant variable
in China presents a correlation with city fixed effects similar to the correlation of city density
with city fixed effects in developed countries. Conversely, the correlation between city fixed
effects and density appears to be much lower in China.
The migrant share and the employment density are pretty highly correlated, with a corre-
lation at 0.34 (see Table 8, Appendix E). As explained in section 1.1, they must be introduced
simultaneously for a correct interpretation. This is done in column (3). The explanatory
power is only slightly above that of the migrant variable alone, and as expected, both esti-
mated elasticities decrease in magnitude.
Although the specification with these two variables misses other agglomeration effects
that we discussed in section 1.2, one can attempt to instrument it in order to estimate a
more causal effect of city migrant share and density on natives’ wages. The corresponding IV
estimates are reported in column (4). Such instrumentation is demanding because of both
reverse causality and many possibly missing effects, but we produce an estimation where the
over-identification test is passed (with a Hansen p-value of 0.25), and instruments, based on
peripherality, the number of doctors and telephones per capita, and the city size predicted
from its occupational structure, pass weak instruments tests.18 The impact of the migrant
16As some of the instruments are available for 83 cities only, the sample is reduced to these cities for the
second step estimations. OLS estimates on the whole sample of 87 cities provide similar results.
17Table 6 in Appendix C displays estimation results for the first step specification. It fully confirms usual
findings on the determinants of urban wage settings in China.
18The Cragg-Donald statistics we obtain are above the rule of thumb of 10 generally considered as sufficient
for instruments not to be weak. More precisely, however, they are close to the 5% critical values proposed by
Stock and Yogo (2005). In that case, Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimates provide
more reliable point estimates and test statistics than Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). Therefore we use
LIML here. Cragg Donald values are now well above the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instruments critical
values for LIML estimates reported in the notes of Table 2. In any case, TSLS point estimates are in general
only different from LIML ones at the second or third decimal place.
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Table 2: The migration impact - OLS and IV estimates for the second step
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 IV1 OLS4 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5
Migrants 0.405∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.074) (0.046) (0.077) (0.065) (0.073) (0.067)
Density 0.099∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.034) (0.030) (0.035) (0.025)
Land area 0.103∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.044)
Diversity −0.014 −0.182 −0.136 −0.175
(0.135) (0.153) (0.142) (0.147)
Market potential 0.182∗ 0.050 0.081 0.010
(0.096) (0.119) (0.105) (0.128)
Distance to seaport −0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Instruments:
Peripherality N N N Y N Y N Y Y
Henderson occupations N N N Y N Y N N Y
Doctors per capita N N N Y N Y N Y N
Telephones per capita N N N Y N N Y Y N
Historic city N N N N N N Y N Y
Distance to historic c. N N N N N N Y N Y
Manufacturing share N N N N N N Y N Y
Non-agricultural share N N N N N N Y Y Y
R2 0.54 0.18 0.57 0.65
Hansen p-value 0.25 0.11 0.66 0.17 0.59
Cragg-Donald 11.4 12.3 14.1 10.4 7.2
1st Shea part. R2, mig. 0.37 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.43
1st part. Fisher, mig 13.7 10.8 14.2 13.1 9.5
1st Shea part. R2, den. 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.49 0.62
1st part. Fisher, den 32.9 24.3 21.6 33.5 15.7
1st Shea part. R2, mp. 0.58
1st part. Fisher, mp 35.2
1st Shea part. R2, area 0.41
1st part. Fisher, area 7.3
Notes : 83 observations for each regression. The dependent variable is the city fixed effect estimated from
equation (8). Estimation results for the first step are reported in Table 6, Appendix C. All regressors are logged.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗: p < 0.10, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗∗∗: p < 0.01. In columns (4), (6) and (7), the migrant
variable and density are instrumented. In column (8), the migrant variable, density and market potential are
instrumented. In column (9), the migrant variable, density and land area are instrumented. In the instruments
list, ’Y’ means that the variable is used as an instrument, ’N’ that it is not. LIML estimates for the parameters
are reported. Critical values for the weak instrument test at the 5% significance level for a 0.10 desired maximal
LIML size (most demanding size in Stock and Yogo, 2005) are 4.7 for IV1, 5.4 for IV2 and IV5, 4.3 for IV3, 8.7
for IV4. The first stage regressions for IV estimates are displayed in Tables 9 and 10, Appendix F.
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share is slightly larger compared with the OLS estimates reported in column (3), but the
increase is not significant. In contrast, the density elasticity increases more, to a level close
to three times the standard values obtained for developed countries.
Since other agglomeration effects are not explicitly introduced, results from this esti-
mation need to be confirmed, primarily because they are highly dependent on instrument
validity. Moreover, they are slightly difficult to interpret because all agglomeration variables
are intertwined and largely correlated with each other, and this is also the case with the
migrant variable, as can be seen in Table 8 in Appendix E. If one wants to assess the migrant
impact for given agglomeration effects, introducing all of them is the strategy to follow, and
this is presented in column (5). First, introducing these additional agglomeration variables
does indeed increase the explanatory power of the model, which reaches the level usually
found for developed countries.19 Second, the elasticity of the migrant variable and that of
density are slightly lower. This is because most other agglomeration variables are positively
correlated with them while also increasing wages.
Column (6) reports IV estimations, using the same instruments as in column (4) from
which we remove the number of telephones per capita, which is not necessary to obtain a
precise estimation. The instruments still pass the over-identification test, as expected since
more control variables are introduced and one instrument is removed. Instruments also
remain strong even if many control variables, also used as instruments, are introduced into
the specification. Both the migrant and density elasticities increase, to a large extent for
the latter. The migrant impact reaches a value at an intermediate level with respect to the
estimates in previous columns.
Of the other agglomeration variables, only land area has a significant impact on the
city fixed effect in column (6). Market potential, which has a slightly significant impact
according to OLS estimates, is not significant any more. This is not due to a lack of precision
or an increase in its standard error, but to a lower value of the estimated parameter itself.
Therefore, in contrast to developed countries for which land area is rarely significant, the
spatial extent of the city for a given density also increases local wages in China, on top
of the positive impact of density on wages. Furthermore, access to other Chinese cities and
foreign markets play no significant role, whereas they usually matter in developed economies.
Diversity plays no role on wages in China as is often the case in developed countries.20
We finally run three further IV estimations to check the robustness of these conclusions.
Considering different sets of instruments does not lead to different values here. This is
19One should bear in mind that in China, the explanatory power arises to a large extent from the migrant
variable, not from employment density.
20The sector classification we use is not very detailed since we only have 11 sectors. As a consequence, our
index may not properly account for the actual industrial diversification.
19
apparent when we use a set of instruments that does not intersect at all with the previous
one, as reported in column (7). This set includes a dummy variable for being a historic
city, the average distance to historic cities, the past city shares of manufacturing and non-
agricultural employment, and the number of telephones per capita. These instruments also
pass the over-identification test and are not weak.21
The literature usually considers that market potential also raises a reverse causality con-
cern, and should be instrumented too, because workers’ and firms’ location choices are spa-
tially correlated, as illustrated by economic geography models. Column (8) instruments
migrant share, density and market potential simultaneously. Although such an instrumen-
tation starts to be very demanding, a sub-set of our instruments satisfies over-identification
and weak instruments tests. They lead to estimates very close to those of the two previous
IV estimations.
Equally, one could argue that land area is also endogenous because the borders of cities are
occasionally redefined according to population and employment growth. Instrumenting four
variables at the same time is not reasonable. Therefore, the last IV estimation instruments
for migrant share, density and land area, but does not consider the impact of other variables
(column (9)). This reduces the possibility of bias due to the endogeneity of the control
variables. Moreover, none of them was significant in previous estimations. A combination of
our previous instruments passes over-identification tests, and they are only slightly weaker.
Explaining land area is difficult because it rarely varies, for reasons not always directly
related to our variables of interest. Still, under these quite different assumptions, elasticities
for migrant share, density and land area are found to be very similar to the previous ones.
Overall, the different estimations confirm the robustness of the effects we estimate. The
elasticity of the migrant share is around 0.32 in our most complete estimations, IV2 to IV5
in Table 2, that of employment density around 0.11, and that of land area 0.12. According
to our discussion in section 1.1, the impact of the migrant variable is the sum of migrants’
substitutability/complementarity and agglomeration effects, β + λ˜. If one assumes that the
agglomeration effect of migrants is similar to that of natives, migrants are complementary
to natives in the production function, and the positive externality is estimated at around
0.32 − 0.11 = 0.21. In other words, about two-thirds of the total impact of migrants on
natives’ wages results from migrant/native complementarity in the production function and
the rest from agglomeration economies.22
21Note also that in general first stage estimations reported in Appendix F present expected signs for all
our IV estimations, even if interpretation is not always easy given the number of instruments and control
variables considered. In particular, both employment density and the migrant share increase in most cases
with the city size predicted by occupations, the number of doctors or telephones per capita, the proximity to
historical cities, or the manufacturing share.
22We also made some attempts to estimate specification (7), although we believe it to be less relevant for
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Table 3: The migration impact - Skilled and Unskilled separately
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skilled Unskilled
OLS1 IV1 OLS2 IV2
Migrants 0.295∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.075) (0.054) (0.085)
Density 0.067∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.036) (0.027) (0.040)
Land area 0.114∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.035) (0.034) (0.040)
Diversity −0.057 −0.213 −0.011 −0.167
(0.141) (0.153) (0.157) (0.171)
Market potential 0.155 −0.004 0.262∗∗ 0.065
(0.100) (0.133) (0.112) (0.149)
Distance to seaport −0.012 −0.005 0.005 0.011
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
R2 0.65 0.57
Hansen p-value 0.33 0.15
Notes: 83 observations for each regression. All regressors are logged.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗: p < 0.10, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗∗∗: p <
0.01. Instruments for columns (2) and (4) are identical to those
in Table 2 column (8). Weak instruments statistics take the same
values.
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From this, we can compute wage gains for natives resulting from increased migration.
For instance, if new migrants move to a city at a constant number of local residents and
if this move increases the migrant share in total employment from the first quartile (decile
respectively) of the distribution of the migrant variable across Chinese cities to the last
quartile (decile respectively), then the associated natives’ wage increase in the city is 10%
(33% respectively). Around two-thirds of that figure comes from the complementarity of
migrants with natives, and around a third from agglomeration effects induced by the increase
in total employment generated by the migrant inflow. If migrants were to replace natives
in local employment, thus keeping total employment density constant, the productivity of
natives would increase by 6.4% (20.6% respectively) through the complementarity effect
alone.
Finally, we test the theory prediction that the impact of migrants should be less positive,
possibly negative, for those workers who are more substitutable by migrant labour in the
production function. To do so, we split the native workers into skilled and unskilled workers,
the categories being defined by each individual occupation, given that migrants are mostly
unskilled. Skilled workers include senior management, professional and technical personnel,
and office workers. First step estimation results for the two groups separately are displayed
in Table 6 in Appendix C. Table 3 reports OLS and IV second-step estimations conducted on
skilled and unskilled native workers separately. For the sake of comparison with the overall
population of natives, we use the same control variables and instruments as in Table 2
column (8), our most complete specification. In keeping with the theory, we find that the
migrant impact is less positive for unskilled than for skilled natives. Due to a lack of precision
in the estimates, the difference is not fully significant from a statistical point of view, however.
Still, when the overall impact of increasing the migrant share in total employment from
the first quartile to the last quartile is 0.37 for skilled natives, it is only 0.27 for unskilled
natives. The latter also experience slightly stronger agglomeration effects, at 0.14 instead
of 0.11. Therefore the complementarity effect is 0.26 for skilled natives, while it is only
0.13 for unskilled natives. These findings confirm the intuition that skilled natives, who are
less substitutable by migrants than unskilled natives, benefit more from migrants. Despite
that, unskilled natives still gain from the presence of migrants, even if we only consider the
complementarity effect.
the reasons detailed in section 1.1. If anything, an even larger overall impact of migrants is obtained.
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4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of migration on local economies by
investigating migration externalities in Chinese cities. China is an interesting case study
because urbanisation has long been regulated by administrative means but labour mobility
has sharply accelerated during the 2000s, feeding urbanisation and concomitantly raising
concerns about the potential impact of migrant inflows on local residents’ outcomes. There-
fore, evaluating the role that migration plays in the process is a crucial step in assessing the
possible scope for regional and urban policy in China.
Using 2007 microeconomic data from the National Bureau of Statistics, we find evidence
of a large positive correlation of the city share of migrants with natives’ wages. A number
of instrumented estimations using different sets of instruments and control variables suggest
that the effect is causal. The large total migrant impact (+10% when one moves from the
first to the third quartile of the migrant variable distribution) can be attributed to gains
from complementarity with natives in the production function (+6.4%, around two-third
of the total), and to gains from agglomeration economies (+3.3%).23 Overall, these results
strongly support the nominal wage gains that can be expected from further migration and
urbanisation in China.
Our findings on migration externalities provide evidence of rural migrants’ contribution
to China’s economic growth and industrialisation. They support the hypothesis of a com-
plementarity, rather than a crowding-out, that migrants bring to local workers. This is fully
consistent with migrants, mostly from rural areas, being mainly concentrated in low-end
labour-intensive industries that feed other local industries, thus contributing to an overall
improvement of urban productivity. There are both institutional and population composition
explanations for this, which have been documented in the literature (see e.g. Cai et al., 2008;
De´murger et al., 2009; Deng and Li, 2010). First, institutional barriers are still high in the
labour market and certain types of jobs are statutorily restricted to local residents. Second,
because migrants are less educated and less skilled on average, they sort “naturally”, making
higher skilled local workers more productive by providing cheap labour to the low-skilled
sector. Our estimations confirm this conjecture by providing some evidence of a larger pos-
itive impact for skilled natives, while the effect remains positive for the unskilled. Among
unskilled workers, migrants are also little substitute to unskilled natives, probably because
the precise occupations and tasks they hold remain different, although to a lesser extent than
for skilled workers.
Beyond the overall large estimated impact of migrants on nominal wages for all types
23The two effects do not add up to the total overall effect because the model for wage levels is not linear.
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of workers, their impact on occupation and location choice cannot be assessed with current
Chinese data, and this remains to be investigated. While it probably played little role in the
past, the feedback could become stronger in the future when migrants’ education levels and
mobility between sectors, in particular, are higher. Furthermore, whether migrants increase
individual welfare is not under study here. To evaluate that, one should also estimate how
the cost of living increases with the arrival of migrants and compare the nominal wage gains
we exhibit with these costs. The literature on this topic is just starting to develop, even for
Western countries, but it is clearly another hot issue to explore for China.
References
Au, C. and Henderson, V. (2006), ‘Are Chinese cities too small?’, Review of Economic Studies
73, 549–576.
Bartik, T. (1991),Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?, W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo (mi).
Borjas, G. J. (2003), ‘The labor demand curve is downward sloping: Reexamining the impact
of immigration on the labor market’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4), 1335–1374.
Borjas, G. J., Freeman, R. B. and Katz, L. F. (1997), ‘How much do immigration and trade
affect labor market outcomes?’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 28(1), 1–90.
Cai, F., Park, A. and Zhao, Y. (2008), The Chinese labor market in the reform era, in
L. Brandt and T. Rawski, eds, ‘China’s Great Economic Transformation’, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, pp. 167–214.
Card, D. (2005), ‘Is the new immigration really so bad?’, Economic Journal 115(507), F300–
F323.
Chan, K. W. (2012), ‘Migration and development in China: Trends, geography and current
issues’, Migration and Development 1(2), 187–205.
Chen, Y., De´murger, S. and Fournier, M. (2005), ‘Earnings differentials and ownership struc-
ture in Chinese enterprises’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 53(4), 933–958.
Ciccone, A. and Hall, R. (1996), ‘Productivity, and the density of economic activity’, Amer-
ican Economic Review 86, 54–70.
Combes, P.-P., Duranton, G. and Gobillon, L. (2008), ‘Spatial wage disparities: Sorting
matters!’, Journal of Urban Economics 63(2), 723–742.
Combes, P.-P., Duranton, G. and Gobillon, L. (2012), ‘The costs of agglomeration: Land
prices in French cities’, CEPR Discussion Paper 9240.
Combes, P.-P. and Gobillon, L. (2015), The empirics of agglomeration economies, in G. Du-
ranton, V. Henderson and W. Strange, eds, ‘Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics’,
Vol. 5A, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
de Sousa, J. and Poncet, S. (2011), ‘How are wages set in Beijing?’, Regional Science and
Urban Economics 41, 9–19.
24
De´murger, S., Gurgand, M., Li, S. and Yue, X. (2009), ‘Migrants as second-class workers in
urban China? a decomposition analysis’, Journal of Comparative Economics 37(4), 610–
628.
Deng, Q. and Li, S. (2010), Wage structures and inequality among local and migrant work-
ers in urban China, in X. Meng, C. Manning, S. Li and T. N. Effendi, eds, ‘The Great
Migration: Rural-Urban Migration in China and Indonesia’, Edward Elgar, pp. 74–92.
Docquier, F., Ozden, C. and Peri, G. (2014), ‘The wage effects of immigration and emigration
in OECD countries’, Economic Journal 124(579), 1106–1145.
Duranton, G. and Puga, D. (2004), Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies, in
V. Henderson and J.-F. Thisse, eds, ‘Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics’, Vol. 4,
North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 2063–2117.
Harris, C. (1954), ‘The market as a factor in the localization of industry in the United States’,
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 44(4), 315–348.
Hering, L. and Poncet, S. (2010), ‘Market access and individual wages: Evidence from China’,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 92, 145–159.
Jacobs, J. (1969), The Economy of Cities, Random House, New York.
Jia, R. (2014), ‘The legacies of forced freedom: China’s treaty ports’, Review of Economics
and Statistics 96(4), 596–608.
Lewis, E. and Peri, G. (2015), Immigration and the economy of cities and regions, in G. Du-
ranton, V. Henderson and W. Strange, eds, ‘Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics’,
Vol. 5A, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Meng, X. and Zhang, D. (2010), ‘Labour market impact of large scale internal migration on
Chinese urban ’native’ workers’, IZA Discussion Paper 5288.
National Bureau of Statistics (2008), China City Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics Press,
Beijing.
Ottaviano, G. and Peri, G. (2012), ‘Rethinking the effects of immigration on wages’, Journal
of the European Economic Association 10(1), 152–197.
Peri, G. (2012), ‘The effect of immigration on productivity: Evidence from U.S. states’,
Review of Economics and Statistics 94(1), 348–358.
Stock, J. H. and Yogo, M. (2005), Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression, in
D. W. Andrews and J. H. Stock, eds, ‘Identification and Inference for Econometric Models:
Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 80–
108.
Wu, W. and Gaubatz, P. (2013), The Chinese city, Routledge, London.
25
APPENDIX
A Summary statistics
Table 4: Summary statistics for local variables
Mean Std. Dev. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Employment density 414.2 426.6 25.44 61.76 315.1 665.0 938.1
(workers per sq. km)
log employment density 5.353 1.347 3.236 4.123 5.753 6.500 6.844
Area (sq. km) 2296.8 3098.0 537 835 1623 2718 4225
log area 7.337 0.867 6.286 6.727 7.392 7.908 8.349
Diversity 6.071 1.036 4.553 5.443 6.039 6.840 7.531
log diversity 1.789 0.175 1.516 1.694 1.798 1.923 2.019
Specialisation 0.170 0.0305 0.133 0.146 0.166 0.184 0.220
log specialisation -1.789 0.175 -2.019 -1.923 -1.798 -1.694 -1.516
Market potential 162875 44600 99812 138752 167345 181594 215843
log market potential 11.96 0.288 11.51 11.84 12.03 12.11 12.28
Distance to seaport 521.5 414.6 82.75 179.2 428.0 721.4 1229.2
log distance 5.619 1.733 4.416 5.189 6.059 6.581 7.114
Migrant share 0.285 0.211 0.0842 0.140 0.208 0.361 0.624
log (1-migrant share)−1 0.422 0.540 0.0879 0.150 0.233 0.448 0.978
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics (2008); 1% Population Census 2005.
Notes: 87 observations. Diversity is measured by the inverse of a sector concentration Herfindhal
index, Specialisation is measured by the share in the local economy of employment in the firm’s
sector and Market potential is defined by the inverse-distance weighted sum of densities over all
Chinese cities other than the city considered.
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B First step variance analysis
Table 5 presents a full variance decomposition of the first step estimation reported in Table 6.
It consists in computing, for each worker, the effect of a set of variables (by summing over
the variables the estimated parameter times the value of the variable), and then the variance
of this effect across all individuals and its correlation with the dependent variable. These
computations allow measuring the explanatory power of each set of variables as well as
its correlation with the other sets, so as to assess to what extent the observed effects are
intertwined. Unsurprisingly, individual characteristics have the highest explanatory power.
Their standard deviation (0.30) is half that of wages (0.75) and their correlation with wages
(0.5) is the highest among all the effects (except residuals). Of particular interest here,
city fixed effects also have a substantial explanatory power: The set of city dummies comes
second after individual characteristics, with a similar standard deviation and a correlation
with wages slightly lower. Sector dummies explain less than location, but ownership is fairly
important. This fully corroborates the conclusions presented in section 3.1.
Table 5: Summary statistics for the variance decomposition
Mean St. dev. Simple correlation with lwage
log wage 9.780 0.745 1
Effect of:
Individual characteristics 1.477 0.303 0.497∗∗∗
Sector dummies 0.0268 0.0969 0.243∗∗∗
Enterprise ownership -0.102 0.115 0.285∗∗∗
City variables 8.378 0.315 0.398∗∗∗
Among which:
City fixed effects 8.490 0.314 0.398∗∗∗
Specialisation -0.112 0.0381 0.00441
Residuals 1.12e-10 0.555 0.744∗∗∗
N 14,590
Notes: The variance decomposition is based on estimation displayed in Table 6 column
(1). ∗: p < 0.10, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
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C First step estimation
Table 6: Individual wage disparities - OLS estimates for the first step
Log(wage) All Skilled Unskilled
Male 0.252∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.00992) (0.0122) (0.0165)
Years of education 0.0643∗∗∗ 0.0783∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗
(0.00217) (0.00275) (0.00347)
Experience 0.0398∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗
(0.00162) (0.00208) (0.00261)
Experience squared -0.000838∗∗∗ -0.000939∗∗∗ -0.000773∗∗∗
(0.0000389) (0.0000490) (0.0000644)
Urban collective enterprises -0.274∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0271) (0.0324)
Private or individual enterprises -0.226∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0289) (0.0241)
Other ownership -0.224∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0163) (0.0208)
Agriculture, mining 0.162∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0563) (0.0580)
Electricity, gas and water 0.238∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0431) (0.0526)
Construction 0.0975∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ -0.0236
(0.0337) (0.0432) (0.0560)
Transport, storage, telecom 0.0926∗∗∗ 0.0706∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0268) (0.0286)
Wholesale and retail trade -0.0313 -0.0970∗∗∗ -0.0594∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0301) (0.0245)
Finance and insurance 0.253∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0394) (0.0701)
Real estate 0.113∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.0260
(0.0315) (0.0405) (0.0506)
Social services -0.186∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0295) (0.0285)
Health, education, culture and research 0.0412∗∗ 0.0580∗∗∗ -0.0163
(0.0177) (0.0212) (0.0349)
Government and party agencies 0.0329∗ -0.0210 0.0415
(0.0186) (0.0213) (0.0502)
Specialization 0.0552∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0140) (0.0166)
Occupation dummies Yes No No
City dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 14,590 8,823 5,767
adj. R2 0.442 0.399 0.350
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. ∗: p < 0.10, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗∗∗: p < 0.01. Experience is
the actual number of years of work experience, i.e. participation to the labour force, reported
in the survey. Reference groups: for occupation: other occupation (including soldiers); for
enterprise ownership: state-owned enterprises; for economic sector: manufacturing.
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D Feasible generalised least square (FGLS) estimator
for the second stage
Table 7: The determinants of city effects - FGLS estimates for the second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS1 FGLS2 FGLS3 FGLS4
Migrants 0.404∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.046)
Density 0.102∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.019) (0.024)
Land area 0.103∗∗∗
(0.030)
Diversity −0.077
(0.131)
Market potential 0.154
(0.098)
Distance to seaport −0.010
(0.013)
Notes: 83 observations for each regression. All regressors are
logged. Standard errors in brackets. ∗: p < 0.10, ∗∗: p < 0.05,
∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
E Pairwise correlation coefficients for local variables
and wage
Table 8: Pairwise correlation coefficients for local variables and wage
Wage Employment Area Diversity Market Distance to Migrant
density potential seaport share
Wage 1
Employment density 0.37∗∗∗ 1
Area 0.25∗ -0.43∗∗∗ 1
Diversity 0.22∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.08 1
Market potential 0.43∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ -0.24∗ 0.06 1
Distance to seaport -0.33∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.19 -0.38∗∗∗ 1
Migrant share 0.71∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.18 0.26∗ 0.41∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗ 1
Notes : All variables are in logarithm. The migrant share variable is defined consistently with the description
given in section 1.1. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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F First stage regression for instrumented regressions
Table 9: First stage regressions for IV estimates, part I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV1 IV1 IV2 IV2 IV3 IV3
Dens. Mig. Dens. Mig. Dens. Mig.
Land area −0.525∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗ −0.713∗∗∗ 0.074
(0.095) (0.055) (0.092) (0.053)
Diversity 1.551∗∗∗ 0.462∗ 0.976∗∗ 0.385
(0.449) (0.259) (0.414) (0.238)
Market potential 1.397∗∗∗ 1.664∗∗∗ 0.275 1.496∗∗∗
(0.410) (0.236) (0.508) (0.292)
Distance to seaport −0.089∗ 0.031 −0.036 −0.0071
(0.052) (0.030) (0.045) (0.026)
Peripherality −1.104∗∗ 0.204 0.620 1.777∗∗∗
(0.491) (0.266) (0.593) (0.326)
Henderson occupations −2.982 5.077∗∗∗ 3.419 4.614∗∗∗
(2.899) (1.567) (2.574) (1.482)
Doctors per capita 0.699∗∗ −0.379∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.070
(0.279) (0.151) (0.228) (0.100)
Telephones per capita 0.755∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.075) (0.142) (0.081)
Historic city 0.750∗∗∗ 0.173
(0.188) (0.108)
Distance to historic city −0.695 1.558∗∗∗
(0.720) (0.414)
Manufacturing share 0.347 0.291∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.138)
Non-agriculture share −0.219 −0.786∗∗
(0.255) (0.147)
R2 0.63 0.41 0.75 0.51 0.81 0.65
Notes : 83 observations for each regression. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗: p < 0.10,
∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
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Table 10: First stage regressions for IV estimates, part II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV4 IV4 IV4 IV5 IV5 IV5
Dens. Mig. MP. Dens. Mig. Area
Land area −0589∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.049∗∗
(0.081) (0.054) (0.021)
Diversity 1.229∗∗∗ 0.288 −0.055
(0.416) (0.277) (0.106)
Distance to seaport −0.091∗∗ −0.034 −0.040∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.030) (0.011)
Peripherality −0.898∗∗ 0.045 −0.983∗∗∗ 3.144∗ 3.301∗∗∗ −1.835
(0.381) (0.253) (0.097) (1.652) (0.804) (1.346)
Henderson occupations 0.465 5.859∗∗∗ 7.549∗∗
(3.578) (1.741) (2.916)
Doctors per capita 0.829∗∗∗ −0.073 0.196∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.165) (0.063)
Telephones per capita 0.707∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.083) (0.032)
Historic city 0.400∗ 0.170 0.852∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.112) (0.188)
Distance to historic city −4.916∗∗∗−3.427∗∗∗ 3.125∗∗
(1.853) (0.902) (1.510)
Manufacturing share 1.159∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ −0.178
(0.337) (0.164) (0.275)
Non-agriculture share −0.337 −0.720∗∗∗ −0.013 0.191 −0.766∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.233) (0.155) (0.059) (0.371) (0.180) (0.302)
R2 0.61 0.50 0.71 0.55 0.43 0.36
Notes : 83 observations for each regression. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗: p < 0.10,
∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
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